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Abstract 
The objective of the paper is to survey the state of knowledge of economists and agricultural 
economists  at  the  onset  of  transition  and  seventeen  years  later.  The  ‘standard’  economic 
reasoning in the early nineties were based on neoclassical economics and documented was has 
been termed the Washington Consensus. It is shown that the discrepancy between expectations 
and reality as well as the evolution of institutional economics has challenged economists. A ‘blue 
print’  favoured  in  the  early  nineties  seems  to  be  opposed  by  many  economist  nowadays. 
Agricultural economists have been influenced by the lines of thought in the main profession, but 
there approach became country-specific in early years of the transition period. Nevertheless, there 
are some open questions concerning assessment and approach in giving policy advice. 
Key words: Washington Consensus, land reform, farm organization  
1  INTRODUCTION 
We all had the privilege of observing a unique change in the global economy. A large number of 
world economies dissolved their economic systems, which were based on a planned economy, 
and tried to introduce a market economy. Most Western economists celebrated the decline of the 
socialist systems and considered this as proof of the superiority of the market economic systems. 
Hence, it was expected that the well-being of people living in these countries would improve fast. 
Of course, economists knew that the transition from one economic state to another could not be 
ordered by political order, but needed the design of specific policies that often result in delayed 
positive effects. Understandably, economists were in high demand. Economic advice was needed 
for  the  design  and  implementation  of  policies.  In  general,  economists  accepted  the  role  of 
advisers; it was considered a chance to apply the widely accepted economic know-how of the 
profession. The transition of planned economies was considered a huge experiment to prove the 
superiority of a market economy. However, it may well be that many economists were not aware 
that their past experience had been derived from observations in market economies and that their 
theories had been never tested in economies that had to be transferred from plan to market. There 
was widespread agreement about how a market economy should look like and what the role of 
the state should be in such an economy, but there was less agreement how the transition from one 
state to the other should be orchestrated. Hence, the performance in transition countries provides 
a unique chance for economists to test and question their basic understanding of policy reform. 
After more than 15 years, stocktaking seems appropriate. The main purpose of such an exercise is 
not to prove that some assessments and recommendations were not the best. Instead, the purpose 
is to learn from the past. Our profession can learn the most from the past if there is a consensus 
about the explanation of the development of transition economies and the identification of policy 
effects. Fortunately, stock taking is facilitated in one aspect. There seemed to be fairly wide 
agreement at the beginning of the 1990s what kind of policies should be instituted to speed up on 
the road from a planned to a market economy. In terms of overall policy recommendations, we 
can rely on the so-called Washington Consensus. In terms of agricultural economics, the state of 
affairs at the beginning of the 1990s has probably been recorded the best in a WORLD BANK 
document in which the leading Western economists had the opportunity to present their view on 
what should be done in transition countries.    3 
Concerning stock taking of performance and reconsideration of earlier recommendations, there 
are some excellent publications focusing on the general economy. One of the publications is a 
book by the  WORLD BANK on “Economic Growth in the 1990s. Learning from a Decade of 
Reforms” in 2005 (WORLD BANK, 2005) and a review article by RODRIK in 2006. There are 
numerous studies on the performance of the agricultural sector and the impact of agricultural 
policies. What seems to be missing is an assessment of the basic assumptions of agricultural 
economists, the observation of the facts, and a reconsideration of the basic assumptions. The 
paper tries to contribute to a discourse on these issues.  
Agricultural economics is a special branch of economics, and it can be assumed that the state of 
affairs in economics is also relevant for agricultural economics. Therefore, the first part of the 
paper presents the widely shared  knowledge among economists and their expectations at the 
beginning of the 1990s, the factual development, and the reconsideration of some economists. 
The main questions to answer are: Would general economists give the same kind of advice today 
as in the early 1990s? In what respect would the advice differ if there were a difference at all? Is 
there agreement on how to measure the overall economic performance of transition countries? Is 
it likely that performance would be better if different advice had been given?  
In the second part of the paper, similar questions as in the first part will be looked at, but the 
focus is on agriculture and agricultural economists.  
 
2  GENERAL ECONOMISTS AND TRANSITION 
2.1 The state of affairs in general economics at the beginning of the transition 
It is well-known that two economists hardly agree on specific issues. Hence, it seems unrealistic 
to look for a widely accepted view. Fortunately, there is a publication available that expresses the 
main view of the dominant organizations in the field of development and policy advice, namely 
the WORLD BANK and the International Monetary Fund, at the beginning of the 1990s. Moreover, 
what was called the Washington Consensus was shared by many leading economists outside the 
two  organizations.  WILLIAMSON  stated  “that  the  Washington  Consensus  is  a  ‘universal 
convergence,’” and that it constitutes “the common core of wisdom embraced by  all serious 
economists” (WILLIAMSON 1993, p. 1334). He codified the approach as a set of 10 axiomatic 
generalizations  that,  given  certain  values,  are  generally  shared  by  scholars  and  practitioners 
concerned with economic growth in developing countries. He also listed the remaining analytical 
problems on which normal economic science needs to focus. Finally, he dismissed those who 
challenged  the  consensus  view  as  “cranks”  (p.  1330).””(quoted  by  GORE  2000,  p.  790). 
Moreover, there is ample evidence that the economic understanding that led to the Washington 
Consensus  has  been  the  backbone  of  the  main  external  policy  advice  given  to  individual 
transition countries. Hence, it is well justified to consider the Washington Consensus as the state 
of affairs in economic policy advice at the beginning of transition.  
The Washington Consensus of 1990 reflected a summary of the lowest common denominator of 
policy  advice  addressed  by  Washington-based  institutions  (including  the  WORLD  BANK) 
(Williamson 2000). The consensus was summarized in the following 10 propositions.  
(1)  Fiscal discipline   4 
(2)  A redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields offering both high economic 
returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as primary health care, 
primary education, and infrastructure 
(3)  Tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base) 
(4)  Interest rate liberalization 
(5)  A competitive exchange rate 
(6)  Trade liberalization 
(7)  Liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment 
(8)  Privatization 
(9)  Deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit) 
(10) Secure property rights. 
Even if stated as “the common core of wisdom embraced by all serious economists” (Williamson 
1993, p. 1334), the propositions were not accepted by all quarters. Terms used to describe the 
Washington “Consensus” included ‘neoliberalism,’ ‘market fundamentalism’ (Williamson 2000), 
or a summary in the forms ‘free up trade, practice sound money, and go home early,’ ‘liberalize 
as much as you can, be tough in monetary and fiscal matters,’ or ‘policy advice based on free 
market principles and monetary discipline’ (Williamson, 2000) indicate the objections against the 
advice. Nevertheless, there are clear indications that the WORLD BANK and the IMF followed 
these recommendations. 
The  Washington  Consensus  is  completely  in  line  with  traditional  economic  thinking.  The 
deductions are based on a collection of hypotheses that are the basis of neoclassical economics. 
Hence, the conclusions are only acceptable as policy advice if the hypotheses concerning the 
behavior of political and economic agents reflect the reality in a given country. If these agents 
had behaved the same all over the planet, the policy advice would have been the same for all 
transition  countries.  Given  these  assumptions,  the  Washington  Consensus  was  considered  a 
blueprint for policy advice in transition countries. Actually, the recommendations describe a final 
state of a market economy given the stated assumptions of neoclassical theory.  
The recommendations seem to be less helpful for giving advice on how to move from here (the 
plan) to there (the market). Transition requires by definition a change in the coordination of 
decision  making  in  the  society,  moving  from  central  to  decentralized  decision  making. 
Organizations that received orders on how to cooperate have to set up bilateral or multilateral 
agreements with other organizations. Organizations are groups of individuals, which are bound 
by some common purpose to achieve objectives. Hence, organizations are comparable to the 
players in a game. Family farms and collective farms are important organizations, but so are 
ministries, parties, the central bank, and the Court of Auditor. It is obvious that the specifics of 
organizations vary widely across countries. Moreover, the rules (institutions) that constrain their 
behavior vary as well. It should be noted that these rules do not only and mainly reflect the 
legislation in a country. They also reflect among others how the rules are set up (decision-making 
procedure),  how  the  rules  are  enforced,  and  the  so-called  embedded  institutions,  which  are 
mainly based on the culture of a nation. Of course, the behavior of organizations is not only 
constrained by the institutions that deal with interactions among organizations, but also by rules 
that determine the internal relationship of a specific organization.   5 
The importance of organizations and institutions will be highlighted by the discussion of selected 
recommendations of the Washington Consensus. 
To (1) Fiscal discipline: Fiscal discipline is indeed a necessary condition for transition. It 
is  likely  easy  to  convince  policymakers  of  this  importance.  However,  what  matters  from  a 
political point of view is how to move from here to there. Keep in mind that policymakers in 
transition countries had little information on potential tax revenue resulting from policy changes 
and  also  about  the  marginal  effects  of  spending.  Flows  of  information  among  the  different 
government bodies were regularly limited, and thus, it was hardly possible to assess the request 
for budget allocation of individual departments. Moreover, there was no clear division of labor 
between the private and the state sectors at the beginning, e.g., agriculture had to provide for 
many services in rural areas that are normally undertaken by the government. It is questionable 
how helpful a recommendation to ‘adhere to fiscal discipline’ really is.  
To (2) Redirection of public expenditure: Most policymakers had likely agreed that a 
redirection of public expenditure was needed from the start of transition. However, how could 
this redirection be implemented? Redirection implies to take from someone and to favor others. 
Normally, the losers are better organized than the winners, as the loss shows up sooner than the 
gain. How could a consensus in the society be reached if the basic understanding of economic 
effects was so poor as at the beginning of transformation? Moreover, it has to be noted that none 
of these countries had an administrative infrastructure in place that could be used. Corruption 
must also be taken into consideration. Hence, redirection of public expenditure had to take into 
account  many  constraints,  not  just  the  expected  main  effects.  Policy  advice  neglecting  these 
constraints was not very helpful. Moreover, huge public expenditure may have been needed to 
take care of market failure. However, the countries did not have strong policy units to identify the 
kind of public goods that were needed the most.  
To (3) Tax reform: Of course, tax reform was needed as the planned economy was mainly 
financed by revenue from state-owned enterprises. However, how can tax reform be implemented 
if the economy is not mainly based on monetary transactions, but on barter? If information on 
income is rudimental, tax administration weak, and tax evasion pervasive, effective tax reform is 
difficult.  What  matters  the  most  are  the  constraints  and  not  just  the  advice  about  in  which 
direction a move is needed.  
To (4) Interest rate liberalization: Again, it sounds acceptable that interest rates should be 
liberalized during an early phase of the transition process. However, how important interest rate 
liberalization actually is depends very much on the economic stage of the economy. Interest rates 
are of importance if borrowed capital is important in the economy. However, transition countries 
have even up to now only a small share of private credit as a percentage of their GDP. The 
economic and social climate is not adequate for the creation of a credit market.  
To (5) A competitive exchange rate: A liberal trading system with competitive exchange 
rates generally supports growth in market economies. However, many transition countries had no 
competitive markets, and they suffered from many non-tariff barriers to trade. The notion of a 
competitive exchange rate is somewhat vague if markets function so imperfectly, as in most 
transition countries in the early stages of transition.  
To (6) Trade liberalization: It may sound easy to follow the advice to liberalize trade. 
However, one should keep in mind that any trade liberalization demands internal adjustment and, 
hence, mobilizes political resistance. Adjustment in these countries needs, of course, time. The   6 
problem  may be illustrated with the help of one example. The value added of East German 
agriculture was highly negative even at highly supported EU prices at the time of unification. 
Had this sector been confronted with EU market prices without any government support, most of 
the agricultural enterprises would have gone bankrupt within a very short period of time. Keeping 
in mind the mal-functioning labor and capital markets at that time, unemployment in rural areas 
would have been a major problem, even more than it actually became. Experience has proved that 
the agricultural sector in East Germany evolved to one of the most competitive sectors in East 
Germany within a few years. The message that can be drawn is as follows: trade liberalization 
has to take into account the ability of the sectors to adjust and—equally important—the ability 
and willingness of the population to cope with the changes in the economic environment. Hence, 
trade  liberalization,  even  if  accepted  as  an  efficient  instrument  for  growth  of  welfare  in  the 
medium and long term, may not be a reasonable instrument in the first stages of transition.  
To (7) Liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment: There is ample evidence that 
foreign direct investment can contribute to faster transition and, thus, can soften the hardship of 
transition. However, two points seem to be in order.  First, following the advice to liberalize 
inflows  of  foreign  investment  may  not  result  in  noticeable  effects.  Foreign  investors  do  not 
mainly  take  into  account  the  barriers  of  entry  to  a  country,  but  the  internal  economic 
environment. Second, liberalizing of capital inflows may have to take into account the reser-
vations of the population. The population may be afraid of and may reject foreign investors. 
Purchase of land by foreigners is a special case in point. Even if the population accepts that 
foreigners would improve the efficiency  of the agricultural sector, the population may  reject 
access to land by foreigners. The attitude may be partly explained by expected negative effects on 
the  labor  markets,  but  also  by  cultural  beliefs.  Land  is  considered  not  just  as  a  factor  of 
production, but as something special. Allowing foreigners to buy land without any restrictions 
may have caused political unrest in some transition countries.  
To (8) Privatization: Without question, a market economy has to be based on private 
ownership. Hence, privatization of state-owned capital is an absolute necessity. Nevertheless, the 
political advice ‘liberalize fast’ may delay a sound restructuring of the economy. First, the timing 
and form of privatization affect not only distribution of wealth and income but also the efficiency 
of  the  economy  and,  even  more  importantly,  the  acceptance  of  market-oriented  policies.  If 
transaction  costs  did  not  matter,  privatization  might  be  always  better  than  non-privatization. 
However, it is known that transaction costs are highly important and, hence, affect economic 
performance.  Second,  privatization  in  an  economy  with  non-competitive  and  not  transparent 
commodity markets and badly-functioning credit and land markets may lead to the enrichment of 
a few without contributing to the intended efficiency in the economy. Third, privatization can 
affect  a  country’s  ability  to  raise  taxes  and  may  impair  the  fulfillment  of  the  government’s 
function. Take, for example, the case of Russia. Privatization of the oil industry without having 
the administrative capacity to tax the new private owners limited government revenues and the 
provision of public goods. Privatization of agriculture is a special case in point. Socialist farms 
had to provide for many services that are offered by the public sector in market economies. 
Hence, privatization without having set up the infrastructure for the public sector would have led 
to socially unacceptable results; poverty of the rural poor would have been increased.. 
To (9) Deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit): Possibly, all market economies 
intend to deregulate their economies. Past regulations may have improved the well-being of the 
population at the time of its setting into operation, but may have proved to be counterproductive   7 
after some time. It is well-known that deregulation is a highly sensitive political issue. Countries 
succeed with deregulation only under exceptional condition, such as in New Zealand in the year 
1984 and thereafter. Hence, it is not very helpful to advise transition countries that they have to 
deregulate; it is more important to develop a strategy, which may lead to success. Such a strategy 
has to take into account the institutional framework in the country as well as conditions on the 
political markets.   
To (10) Secure property rights: It is widely accepted that a market economy can only 
function efficiently if property rights are secure. However, it is unclear to what extent property 
rights have to be secured at different stages during the transition phase. The comparison of China 
and Russia indicates that China, with less secure property rights, was much more attractive for 
investors than Russia. Consequently, growth in China significantly surpassed that of Russia. The 
issue of property rights has a different meaning in a planned economy than in a market economy. 
Hence, the role of the government differs in these two economies. It is not easy to define the role 
that the government has to play in the transition process moving from privatization to securing 
property rights. Moreover, policymakers will not base their decisions on a well-defined social 
welfare  function.  Instead,  they  may  pursue  their  own  personal  interests.  Given  the  weak 
monitoring of policy decisions during the first years of transition, policymakers may have quite a 
lot  of  leeway  in  their  decisions  pursuing  their  personal  interests.  Hence,  the  question  arises 
whether property rights can be secured adequately if policymakers are not willing, able, and/or 
inclined to secure them.  
This short discussion of the 10 Commandments hint at the shortcomings of corresponding 
recommendations.  
First, it was assumed that the policy changes needed were the same for all countries. 
Country-specific information was not needed.  But viable policy changes are always country-
specific as the political economy differs from country to country. 
Second, the role of institutions, defined as rules that constrain human behavior and make 
it  predictable,  were  widely  neglected  (see,  among  others,  KOLODKO,  1999,  p.  235).  As 
institutions are country-specific, there is no blueprint for policy reform that could be applied to 
all countries. The new role of the government, political economy aspects, policy and market 
failure were widely neglected.  
Third, the recommendations were not based on an analysis of the most binding constraints 
for prosperity. Hence, there was no built-in priority of measures to be introduced (RODRIK, 2006, 
p. 985). Privatization may not lead to an enabling environment for investors and may not spur 
growth if the legal and administrative framework is not in place to secure property rights.  
Is there a consensus on what would have been better advice and what should be future 
advice? The WORLD BANK (1995) seems to have changed the past approach. The organization 
has widely accepted the reasoning of RODRIK (2006) that institutions matter, that it is important 
to identify the country-specific constraints, to emphasize market failure and the new role of the 
State, and to design reform based on attacking the main constraints.  
In contrast, the sister organization in Washington, the IMF, seems to stick to the original 
commandments, but augments them with a list of essential institutional aspects (KRUEGER 2004). 
The focus is still not on identifying the main constraints. Thus, there seems to be no consensus in 
the  profession  of  economists.  There  are  still  many  who  consider  the  advice  based  on  the 
Washington Consensus to be the best approach. Consequently, the disappointing experience is   8 
diagnosed  as  a failure of  policymakers to  implement policy  advice accurately.  However,  the 
pendulum seems to have moved to the direction advocated by RODRIK (2006) and the WORLD 
BANK (2005). 
3  AGRICULTURAL ECONOMISTS AND TRANSITION 
Agricultural  economics  is a  subset  of  general  economics,  and one should  not expect  a  huge 
difference in the main paradigms. However, agricultural economists are generally more applied 
in their work than most of those working in the main areas of economics. The famous quotation 
by  LEONTIEF  has  been  quoted  many  times  as  proof  of  the  problem-oriented  research  of 
agricultural economists (LEONTIEF 1971, p. 5). 
The basic understanding of the leading agricultural economists is well documented in a WORLD 
BANK  study  (WORLD BANK  1992).  It  is  obvious that  these agricultural  economists  are  well-
trained neoclassical economists; hence, they advocated for fast privatization and, similar as their 
colleagues, did not focus much on market failure, political economy aspects, and the new role of 
the government. However, they addressed explicitly the need to deal with market failure on the 
capital  market,  on  the  land  market,  and  the  market  for  extension,  research,  and  training. 
Moreover, they emphasized the importance of governance in the public sector and on farms. The 
need for restructuring large farms was well highlighted. There also seemed to be a consensus that 
corporate farms are less efficient than family farms, that large farms are less efficient than small 
farms, and that there would be a strong incentive to set up family farms. Less emphasis was 
placed on dealing with market failure and the role of the state to provide the needed public goods.  
There  is  a  general  consensus  that  expectations  were  not  met.  However,  there  seems  to  be 
disagreement concerning the main reasons for the bad performance. In particular, there seems to 
be no general agreement on the following points, which will be discussed: 
·  How to measure performance? 
·  Is there a strong relationship between land reform and agricultural performance?  
·  Are  there  economies  of  scale  in  agriculture  that  put  family  farms  at  a  disadvantage 
compared to larger private farms? Are economies of scale really the main determinant of 
farm size?  
·  Do family farms perform better than corporate farms?  
·  How important are institutions for the foundation of family farms and the development of 
the agricultural sector?  
How to measure agricultural performance? 
Policymakers tend to focus on the volume of agricultural production. An increase in production is 
often considered to be a success and a decline a failure. However, from an economic point of 
view, such a criterion is not very meaningful. A negative change in agricultural production might 
be needed if the country wants to use its resources efficiently. Moving from a highly protected 
agricultural sector to a competitive sector is likely accompanied by a decline in production. Of 
course, transition can be considered as successful if the overall GDP exceeds that of the pre-
transition period, but this will not necessarily hold for each individual sector.    9 
An indicator that is often used by economists is the change in total factor productivity. Again, 
this seems to be a perfect indicator for the whole economy with undistorted markets. The positive 
change in total factor productivity implies a more efficient use of resources, which is the ultimate 
aim of transition. However, this indicator could be highly misleading if the transition has led to 
high  unemployment.  Production  could  be  higher,  but  total  factor  productivity  is  lower  if  all 
factors were employed. A better indicator would be ‘total production divided by total available 
factors of production in the economy whether employed or not.’ This indicator would yield a 
lower number than total factor productivity calculated as total production divided by employed 
resources.  
The total factor productivity of agriculture is widely used as a measure of performance (see, for 
example, ROZELLE and SWINNEN 2004). The problem of this indicator can be illustrated with the 
experience  of  the  former  GDR.  Agriculture  was  not  competitive  at  the  time  of  unification. 
Actually, value added at EU prices for output and inputs was negative in 1989. Within a few 
years, agriculture in the New  Laender became  more profitable than in  West Germany. Total 
factor productivity went up significantly. One would like to certify a high performance status for 
agriculture of the former GDR. However, there is a significant problem. There was huge labor 
shedding (83% within a 4-year period), and there was huge unemployment in rural areas (up to 
30%). Farms did substitute labor for highly subsidized capital. The overall economy would have 
been better off if the scarce factor capital had been used in other economic sectors and if more 
labor  were  employed  in  agriculture.  A  better  performance  indicator  would  have  been  the 
comparison of the value of the marginal product of factors used in agriculture valued at economic 
shadow prices of factors. More discussion in this field seems to be needed.  
Another convincing approach has been created by CSAKI (CSAKI, C. and J. NASH, 1997). He 
developed a methodology that can be used to assess the status of agricultural reform. In contrast 
to earlier WORLD BANK studies, CSAKI identifies five areas where reform is needed, including 
institutional reform, ranks the individual fields on a scale from 1 to 10, and aggregates them. The 
information used was based on the individual assessment of WORLD BANK staff working in the 
individual country, and it informs fairly on the status of reform. The assessment allows countries 
to be grouped with respect to their reform status. This methodology is a huge step away from a 
blueprint policy. The inclusion of the institutional framework takes into account country-specific 
criteria.  
Land reform and agricultural performance 
Agricultural economists emphasize land reform as one of the most important items on the reform 
agenda.  Thus,  one  would  expect  that  there  is  a  close  relationship  between  land  reform  and 
agricultural performance. LERMAN investigated this issue several times, and in his 1998 article, 
he noted that he could not find an evident relationship. This finding was a surprise for many 
agricultural economists, including me. However, the findings in general economics during the 
last decade can shed some light on the puzzle. Land reform should lead to testable results if the 
lack of land reform were the same binding constraint in every country under consideration. This 
does not seem to be the case. A small step in land reform, as in many CIS countries, may have no 
impact as farm workers were often not even aware that they had received ownership of their land. 
But even if they were informed, it did not matter at all or not much; badly functioning product 
and factor markets, not existent markets for land and rural credit, the missing know-how, and the 
unwillingness  to  bear  risk  did  suppress  the  setup  of  family  farms.  In  particular,  embedded 
institutions may have suppressed the potential effects of land reform (KOESTER 2007). Therefore,   10 
the effect of land reform can hardly be identified in a cross-country study. Following the present 
state  of  affairs  as  described  in  the  review  article  by  RODRIK,  the  impact  of  individual 
determinants of performance  cannot be identified with a cross-country  study; performance is 
constrained by different determinants in individual countries, and the marginal change in any of 
the  determinants  has  different  effects  in  different  countries.  Based  on  this  insight,  it  seems 
questionable to place priority on land reform in countries where important markets do not exist or 
are badly functioning and where the public sector has not been set up to provide public goods 
urgently needed in rural areas for making private investment profitable and for provision of social 
services hitherto provided by large farms.  
Economies of scale in agriculture  
There seemed to be a widely held agreement in the profession that the question of economies of 
scale is important for giving policy advice. The question about economies of scale in production 
is seen as related to an efficient farm structure, with a focus on small family farms and not on 
large-scale commercial farms. It seems to be generally agreed that in the absence of substantial 
economies of scale farm internal transaction costs are crucial for the determination of the optimal 
farm size (SCHMITT 1993). ALLEN and LUECK (1998) argue that monitoring costs of workers on 
family and large farms may become the most important determinant of the optimal farm size due 
to  nonexistent  economies  of  scale.  As  family  farms  have  likely  lower  monitoring  costs  of 
workers, family farms may be superior to large farms.  
This line of thought completely neglects market transaction costs. It may well be that family 
farms produce at lower costs than large farms, but lower prices received for products, higher 
prices paid for inputs, and constrained access to credit may overcompensate the advantage in 
production costs. Hence, the conclusion that the nonexistence of economies of scale in agriculture 
leads to the superiority of family farms is logically not well founded. Nevertheless, information 
on whether there are economies of scale in agriculture is important. If there are economies of 
scale, the superiority of family farms is less likely than otherwise.  
It seemed to have been generally agreed among agricultural economists in the early 1990s that 
economies of scale did not exist or were insignificant in agricultural production and that family 
farms are the most efficient organizational form of farms. The most influential publication was 
likely by BINSWANGER et al. (1993). The authors concluded that small farms have a productivity 
advantage (p. 2718). However, they emphasized that the functioning of markets is important and 
that the inverse relationship between productivity and farm size holds more likely in countries 
where wage rates are low and labor intensive agriculture has a comparative advantage. Moreover, 
the empirical investigation was limited to developing countries. One of the papers that may have 
been the most influential as it seems to be the first one focusing on a specific transition country 
was that by van Zyl et al. (1996). However, even if often quoted and accepted as proof, the 
empirical test is not very convincing. First, the data used by the authors represent farms in Poland 
belonging to the size groups < 5ha, 5-10 ha, 10 – 15ha, and above 15 ha. The largest farms are 
44.65  (quality  adjusted)  ha  in  one  of  the  two  regions  under  investigation  and  82.44  (quality 
adjusted) ha in the other region. It is quite obvious that this data set will not allow conclusions 
about the productivity of farms not belonging to this range of sizes. However, what is considered 
a small or a large farm varies widely among countries. Therefore, the generality of the findings is 
highly impaired. Second, the authors calculate total factor productivity, but do not include labor 
as one of the inputs. Consequently, the total factor productivity of small farms is biased upwards 
compared to large farms. Third, the researchers employed data only from the year 1993. It should   11 
be quite clear that farms had not yet completely adjusted to the market environment, in particular 
because the most important markets for adjustment, i.e. the credit and land markets, did not yet 
exist or did not function well.  
There have been numerous studies on estimating economies of scale in agriculture (see GORTON 
and DAVIDOVA, 2004). The methods applied differ. Some studies just calculate production costs 
for farms of different sizes; other researchers estimate total factor productivity or employ the 
production function approach or use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). There is one particular 
interesting publication that reports the results for alternative approaches using the same data set. 
The authors (BOUSSEMART et al. 2006) utilize a Cobb-Douglas production function, a calculation 
of  milk  production  costs  according  to  the  size  of  farms,  a  quadratic  cost  function,  and  an 
application of the DEA method to test for the presence of economies of scale in dairy farming in 
Estonia. They found “that in the cases studied, the extent of economies of scale depended on the 
methods used. The assumption of constant returns is not to be rejected in view of some results. 
Other results would show that the best performances are obtained by family run medium sized 
farms.” This result may be a surprise. However, it should not be. There are doubts whether this 
type of empirical research is adequate to inform on the existence of economies of scale in most 
transition countries with a specific economic environment. 
The problem can be highlighted for the case of production function analysis which is used as the 
basis for cost functions. Of course, the production function only informs on a specific technical 
relation and no specific assumptions are needed. However, if the data are used from a sample of 
farms the assumption is needed that the same production function holds for all farms or that the 
difference can be captured by a dummy variable. An even more significant problem shows up, if 
the estimated production function serves as the basis for the cost function. It has to be  assumed 
that  each  individual  farm  produces  at  the lowest  average  cost  with  given  resources,  and  the 
envelope of the individual average costs is downward sloping and, thus, informs on economies of 
scale. The derived cost function, including a set of small, medium, and large farms, will only 
provide the desired result if some specific assumptions hold: First, all farms have to maximize 
their profit; second, they have to be faced by the same output and input prices; third, they are not 
confronted with risk or uncertainty; fourth, they can adjust fixed and variable factors to such a 
level that allows them to minimize average cost and to maximize profit.  
These assumptions could possibly be realistic for market economies where economic conditions 
have not changed much over time and where product and factor prices are the same for all farms; 
however, the environment is different in transition countries. The production function for large 
farms is certainly different from that of small farms; farms are not in an optimum situation as the 
environment has changed significantly over the last years, and adjustment has been constrained 
by badly functioning markets. Finally, the assumption that product and market prices are the 
same for all farms could only be true if market transaction costs, including access to credit and to 
land endowment, were the same for all farms. As these assumptions do not hold, some farms may 
produce in a shot-run optimum with marginal costs equal to market prices, but marginal costs 
significantly higher than average costs and minimum average costs. Lack of credit and limited 
access to land may result in a suboptimal farm size. This situation may be more pronounced for 
small family farms than for large farms. Consequently, the research may lead erroneously to 
economies of scale.  
One may wonder whether a comparison of production costs between small and large farms could 
provide the desired information. The advantage of this approach is that it takes into account   12 
varying input prices across farms; thus, the measure could inform on the competitiveness of 
alternative farm sizes given the actual environment. However, even this information could not be 
the basis for the sound formulation of policy advice. Averages may not be meaningful if the 
variance is large.  
The  problem  with  the  use  of  averages  will  be  shown  for  the  case  of  farm  data  in  Ukraine. 
DEMYANENKO,  VON  CRAMON-TAUBADEL  (2004) investigated private  farms,  corporations,  and 
cooperatives  in  Ukraine.  The  data  revealed  (see  appendix  Table  1)  that  the  variance  of  all 
variables is very high. Private farms employed at least 3 workers on at least 6 ha and employed at 
most up to 438 workers and cultivated up to 3,972 ha. What does a mean of 141 workers on 
private farms and average acreage of 1467 ha mean? Policymakers may be interested to learn 
which organizational form may be the most profitable. Looking on averages of profit per ha, 
policymakers may conclude that private farms are the most profitable and cooperatives the least. 
However, looking at the highest profit per ha, the data reveal that the best companies and the best 
cooperatives earn a much higher profit per ha than the best private farms. In contrast, the least 
profitable private farms make a smaller loss than the most loss-making companies or cooperative. 
It  would  be  misleading  to  base  policy  decisions  on  averages  if  the  variance  is  as  large  as 
documented for farms in Ukraine. The main determinant of profitability is obviously not the 
organizational form, but some other determinants. If governments aim at improving efficiency in 
agriculture, they are advised to improve the effects of those variables that speed up structural 
change in agriculture. Improved functioning of product and factor markets, and in particular of 
land and credit markets, would support structural change and transfer land to the more efficient 
farmers.  
There  seems  to  be  significant  empirical  evidence  that  economies  of  scale  are  not  the  main 
determinant of farm size and farm structure (GORTON and DAVIDOVA 2004). Market imperfection 
leading  to  high  transaction  costs  favor  large  farms  in  transition  countries,  and  embedded 
institutions  (preference  for  working  on  the  farm  of  ancestors)  seem  to  be  more  important. 
Moreover, managerial ability, including entrepreneurship, determines variance in performance 
across alternative farm sizes to a high extent. Conclusions based on averages may be highly 
misleading.  
The  problem  of  differences  in  input  prices  can  be  overcome  by  a  comparison  of  average 
production costs of ‘typical farms’. A data set that details average production costs for selected 
agricultural products on small and large representative farms in a large number of countries are 
partly available and work is under progress to enlarge the data base. Two Figures, for milk and 
rapeseed equivalents are presented in the Appendix. It is quite obvious that the larger farms 
produce at significant lower average costs than the smaller farms.  
Family farms versus corporate farms 
It is well-known that agriculture in Western market economies is mainly dominated by family 
farms. However, it should be noted that the term ‘family farm’ has not yet been well-defined. The 
German government favored the Leitbild (model) family farm for decades and only said the farm 
has to be managed by a full-time farmer and work has to be mainly provided by the farm family
1. 
According to the USDA, a family earns less than $250,000 gross receipts annually on which day-
                                                 
1 The ‚Leitbild’of the German government has substantially changed after unification. The term ‘family farm’ as 
focus of agricultural policy is not used any more.   13 
to-day labor and management is provided by the farmer and/or the farm family that owns the 
production or owns or leases the productive assets. In Sweden, a family farm is a farm that allows 
one family to support themselves solely on farm income and full-time work (LINDAHL 1995).  
The alternative definitions allow at least identifying those farms that are not family farms. These 
are part-time or full-time farms that generate an inadequate income for the family, farms with a 
hired manager, farms with more hired workers than family workers, and farms that are organized 
as corporations or cooperatives. 
In  spite  of  these  differences  in  clear  definitions  of  the  term  ‘family  farm,’  there  was  wide 
agreement that a family farm is rather small and nevertheless competitive. As this type of farm 
was dominant in Western countries, it was no surprise that the widely held expectation among 
Western agricultural economists at the onset of the transition was a fast move towards family 
farms in transition countries. Obviously, that has not happened. Many of us (see SCHMITT, G. 
1993) argued as follows: as the existing farm structure is made up by  family farms in most 
market  economies,  a  structure  made  up  by  these  farms  must  be  optimal.  This  questionable 
conclusion led to the next questionable conclusion: a farm structure composed by family farms 
would be optimal for transition countries. It seems to be a widely held opinion that the gap 
between  expectations  and  reality  is  due  to  incomplete  policy  reform,  including  creating  an 
enabling  environment,  in  particular  functioning  markets.  However,  it  may  well  be  that  the 
profession misjudged the situation here (in the West) and there (in the East).  
False expectations were partly due to the inaccurate interpretation of the reality in the West. 
SCHMITT (1993) and others concluded that the predominance of family farms in the West proves 
their comparative advantage. However, the existing farm structure in a specific country is not 
mainly the result of pure economic calculations, but it is path-dependency; past farm structure 
determines  largely  present  farm  structure  (BALMAN  1999).  Moreover,  embedded  institutions 
(KOESTER 2007) and sink costs slow down structural change. The agricultural structure at any 
point in time is likely to be far behind the optimal structure. Hence, it was not plausible to think 
that a new farm structure in the East would be similar to the suboptimal structures in the West.  
Even if some studies may show that present private small family farms in a specific transition 
country are the most efficient given the present environment, it is not at all certain that a farm 
sector dominated by small family farms would have evolved in a changed environment with 
functioning markets. Experience shows that the capability of management is a highly important 
determinant of performance. It is likely that some of the best qualified entrepreneurs have already 
started farming. Surveys show that the potential of would-be farmers seems to be limited. Many 
of the would-be farmers, in particular most of the current farm workers, are not willing to change 
their lifestyle and to bear the risk of being a self-employed entrepreneur.  
The importance of institutions 
Most agricultural economists use the neoclassical framework in their research. However, it is 
questionable whether such an approach is the most efficient for research and policy advice in 
transition countries. Neoclassical economics  assumes that people’s behavior is  guided by the 
maximization of utility or profit, taking into account specific given constraints, such as income 
and prices for individual consumers and factor endowment and input prices for entrepreneurs. 
Moreover, it is assumed that decision makers have complete information. Consequently, people 
behave the same in all societies. In contrast, institutional economics emphasizes differences in 
attitudes of people leading to a huge variance in objectives and behavior. Moreover, constraints   14 
for the individual’s behavior are not only materialistic but also depend - or even more specifically 
-  on  the  social,  legal,  and  economic  environment.  However,  rules  that  constrain  individual 
behavior  differ  widely  across  countries;  institutions  are  country-specific  and  even  person-
specific. People in the real world are very much guided by tradition, culture, and beliefs, i.e., by 
embedded institutions. (WILLIAMSON 2000). Beliefs about how the world and the economy work 
are important for individual decisions. Some examples will be given to highlight the importance 
of  embedded  institutions.  It  may  be  that  would-be  farmers  may  not  like  to  become  farmers 
because they have not learned to behave as an entrepreneur, they may be risk-averse, or they may 
not  like  to  change  their  lifestyle.  Transaction  costs  may  be  high  for  getting  credit  or  for 
investments made to order as trust is lacking. The land market may not evolve because people 
consider land to be a specific asset that should not be traded. Land may be idled even if it could 
be used productively by someone. Farm workers may have no bad feelings about shirking and 
stealing. Policymakers may shrink away from genuine policy reforms as constituents may not 
support them and strong interest groups oppose them. Policymakers may intervene in markets 
because they believe that doing so will contribute to food security. Given specific embedded 
institutions, setting up a functioning and well-accepted market economy in a country is not only a 
huge economic problem, but possible more so a political one. Policy advice which does not take 
into account the political market in a country may not be effective. Market liberalization and land 
reform was most likely overemphasized in many countries (Csaki 2004, p. 272). 
SUMMARY 
There  seems  to  be  an  increasing  number  of  general  economists  who  have  changed  their 
understanding  of  transition,  see  past  advice somewhat critically,  and  lay  stress on  some  less 
emphasized issues such as market and policy failure, embedded and other institutions, and a 
strong role for the government. Growth is not to be considered the main policy objective any 
more; distribution of income and wealth have gained importance. Agricultural economists may 
have  had  better  know-how  than  general  economists  to  deal  with  transition  problems,  partly 
because agricultural economists are generally more applied in their work; many had significant 
international  experience  and  were  used  to  take  the  institutional  framework  into  account  in 
conducting their analysis. However, there are still some open questions: What are the adequate 
indicators of agricultural performance in countries where market failure is pervasive? How to 
measure comparative advantages of farm sizes and organization form of farms? How important is 
the  political  market  for  policy  reform  in  a  specific  country?  How  important  are  embedded 
institutions for the design of policy reform and for the impact of policy reform?  
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Figure 2: Farm size and operating costs in rapeseed production 
 
Note: RE = Rapeseed equivalents 
Source: agri benchmark (2006), p. 23. 
Cost advantage of large farms in percent of  









































































































































































































































Source: IFCN Dairy Report 2006 , Hemme et al.
Farm types per country : 1 Average size farm, 2. Larger farm types
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